Security

Serve every page over HTTPS using TLS 1.2 or 1.3, redirect plain HTTP to HTTPS, and disable obsolete SSL and early TLS versions on every host you control.

HSTS tells browsers to only ever use HTTPS for your domain. Send max-age with includeSubDomains - but skip the preload list, which its own operator now discourages.

An HTTPS page that loads any subresource over HTTP is mixed content. Serve every subresource over HTTPS, and send the upgrade-insecure-requests CSP directive as a safety net.

A CSP tells browsers which sources of script, style, image, and frame content to trust. A good policy stops most XSS and data-exfiltration attacks dead.

A response header that names HTTP endpoints to which the browser POSTs structured violation reports - CSP and COOP breaches, permissions-policy violations, deprecations, interventions, and crashes - so you learn what is breaking in the field.

A standard text file at /.well-known/security.txt tells security researchers how to report vulnerabilities. It is cheap to publish and dramatically lowers the bar for responsible disclosure.

The nosniff header stops browsers from guessing a response's content type. It blocks a class of attacks where a benign-looking file is interpreted as script or stylesheet.

Tell browsers who is allowed to embed your pages in an iframe. Use CSP frame-ancestors. X-Frame-Options is the legacy fallback.

Three response headers - Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy, Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy, and Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy - that sever risky cross-window and cross-origin links and defend against side-channel leaks.

Referrer-Policy controls how much URL information your site leaks when users follow a link or load a subresource. strict-origin-when-cross-origin is the sensible default.

Permissions-Policy lets you turn off powerful browser features - camera, microphone, geolocation, payment, USB - for your own pages and for any iframes you embed.

SRI adds a cryptographic hash to every third-party script and stylesheet so the browser refuses to run modified files. Essential for any external JS or CSS you depend on.

RFC 9530 lets a server publish a cryptographic hash of what it sent, so a client can detect corruption in transit. Worth shipping on APIs, file downloads, and machine-readable endpoints; browsers ignore it.

Trusted Types make the browser reject plain strings at DOM injection sinks like innerHTML, demanding a vetted typed value instead. Switched on with two CSP directives, it neutralises a whole class of DOM-based XSS.

A dead header that roughly a third of major sites still send. No shipping browser reads it, it was never standardised, and the values people copy-paste were the dangerous ones. Stop sending it and rely on CSP.

Every cookie should be Secure, HttpOnly where possible, and have an explicit SameSite. Use __Host- and __Secure- prefixes for session cookies.

Clear-Site-Data lets a response tell the browser to wipe cookies, storage, and caches for your origin. Send it on logout so a shared device keeps nothing behind.

A CAA record tells certificate authorities which of them are allowed to issue certificates for your domain. Cheap to add, blocks a class of mis-issuance attacks.

DNSSEC cryptographically signs DNS records so resolvers can verify they have not been tampered with. Strong defence in depth, but only with full registrar and registry support.